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Abstract. We propose a way to unify two approaches to analysis of pro-
tocol security, namely complexity theoretic cryptographic analysis and
formal specification with machine analysis. We present a specification
in Sum of the Bellare–Rogaway cryptographic model and demonstrate
its use with a specification of a protocol of Jakobsson and Pointcheval.
Although this protocol has a proof in the Bellare-Rogaway model, its
original version was flawed. We show that our specification can be used
to find the flaw.
1 Introduction
Even though the problem of key establishment is now widely understood in its
basic form, new protocols continue to be proposed for specialised situations such
as use of devices of low computational power, multi-user groups, and where the
shared keys are low entropy passwords. Meanwhile, more complex protocols for
application areas like electronic payments, electronic auctions and fair exchange
of assets are too difficult to be handled in full generality by most analysis tech-
niques. There is therefore still a pressing need for improved methods for protocol
analysis.
The problem of how to gain confidence in the security of protocols has been
approached by two different research communities: the cryptography community
and the computer security community. The cryptography community has built
on the definitions for cryptographic primitives to provide security proofs for
a relatively small number of protocols. The computer security community has
generally used formal methods to specify protocols which are generally used in
one of two ways. The first way is to search for insecure points within the state
space using a model checker such as FDR [15] or Murφ [16]. The second way is
to use a theorem prover, such as Isabelle [17], to arrive at results which are true
in all states.
Both cryptographic analysis and formal specification have their strengths
and limitations, but the two communities have worked almost independently and
there are even contradictions in what can constitute a secure protocol. A major
issue is how cryptography is handled. In the cryptography community proofs
are usually reduction proofs for which the aim is to show that if the protocol is
broken then some computationally difficult problem (or perhaps a generic cryp-
tographic primitive) can be broken. The computer security community generally
has assumed a model of “perfect cryptography” which means that it is impos-
sible to obtain a ciphertext from a plaintext, or a plaintext from a ciphertext,
without the correct key. Apart from ignoring probabilistic outcomes, this also
means that authentication and confidentiality are not treated independently and
that different kinds of confidentiality cannot be differentiated. A second major
difference is that proofs in the cryptography community are human generated
(“mathematician’s proofs”) rather than machine checkable proofs which can be
obtained with software theorem provers.
This paper contributes to unifying the two approaches by suggesting and
exploring a way of combining the ideas from the two communities. Abadi and
Rogaway [1] have examined the difference in approach between the “perfect cryp-
tography” assumption and cryptographic definitions of confidentiality. However,
no attempt seems to have been made to analyse the same adversarial model
with the two different approaches. We believe that this is a promising way for-
ward. In this paper the Bellare-Rogaway model used for cryptographic proofs
is formally specified, animated and analysed in a machine checkable way. The
long-term aim of this is to gain the benefits of both worlds, by allowing proofs
which are more accessible, more meaningful and more likely to be correct. This
ultimately means a greater assurance in the security of protocols used to protect
our communications.
We illustrate the potential use of our formal specification by using it to ex-
plore a protocol of Jakobsson and Pointcheval [14] that was proved secure in
Bellare and Rogaway’s model. Despite this proof the original version of the pro-
tocol turned out to be flawed, as shown by Wong and Chan [18]. We demonstrate
that the flaw could be revealed by machine analysis of our specification. We con-
tend that this demonstrates the value of a combined approach to the problem
of formal analysis of protocols.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the rest of this sec-
tion we outline the Bellare–Rogaway model and the formal language and tool
that we used. In Section 2 we give more details of the Bellare–Rogaway model
and describe how we captured the model in the formal specification. Section 3
describes the Jakobsson–Pointcheval protocol and our formal analysis of it.
1.1 The Bellare–Rogaway Model
In the 1990s academic cryptography started its move towards a mature science
by demanding new standards of proof. In the last decade commonly accepted
formal definitions have been established for the main cryptographic services such
as confidentiality, integrity and signature, and many specific algorithms have
been proven to satisfy such definitions on the assumption of the computational
difficulty of well established problems such as integer factorisation and discrete
logarithms. Proofs for cryptographic protocols have taken longer to establish
than those for the primitives that they use.
An important direction in cryptographic protocol research was pioneered
by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 [5] when they published the first mathemat-
ical proof that a simple entity authentication protocol was secure. This work,
which covered only the two-party case, was followed up with a paper on server-
based protocols [3] and various authors have extended the same idea to include
public-key based key transport [6], key agreement protocols [7], password-based
protocols [4, 8], and conference key protocols [10, 9].
The general approach is to produce a mathematical model that defines a
protocol in which a powerful adversary plays a central role. The adversary es-
sentially controls all the principals and can initiate protocol runs between any
principals at any time. Insider attacks are modelled by allowing the adversary to
corrupt any principals, and the adversary can also obtain previously used keys.
Cryptographic algorithms may be modelled either with generic properties or as
specific transformations. Security of protocols is defined in terms of matching
conversations (for authentication) and indistinguishability (for confidentiality of
keys).
Because cryptographic protocols are notoriously difficult to design correctly,
a proof of security is a very valuable property. Nevertheless, there are as yet
relatively few protocols available which have a security proof. Most new protocol
designs continue to be published without any attempt to prove security, leading
to the traditional cycle of protocol attack being followed by a fix before a new
attack is found. Some of the reasons for this are the following.
Proofs are difficult to understand. Security proofs tend to be difficult to
understand for the average practioner. They typically run to several pages
of mathematical reasoning. The lack of accessibility of the proofs means that
there are few people who check the proofs in any detail.
Proofs can be wrong. Although there are relatively few protocols with secu-
rity proofs available, a number of protocols which have been proven secure
have turned out to have significant security weaknesses. We give a detailed
example of the protocol of Pointcheval and Jakobsson later.
The significance of proofs can be hard to assess. Protocol goals used in
the Bellare–Rogaway model do not correspond closely to the traditional pro-
tocol goals of authentication and key establishment. In particular, a goal such
as entity authentication is defined in terms of the protocol specific property
of matching conversations. Protocols with different traditional properties
cannot be differentiated by such a property [12].
A comparison between the Bellare–Rogaway model and analysis using formal
specifications shows that they are largely complementary. Proofs of security are
long and complex and therefore prone to error and difficult to understand. Formal
specifications, on the other hand, have not used the complete cryptographic
definitions. It therefore seems a natural way forward to combine the benefits of
both approaches. The bridge to unify these separate domains is the model of
the protocol and the adversary. The same model used in the mathematical proof
will be formally specified. Understanding and validation of the model can also
be enhanced through animation of the specification.
1.2 Sum and Possum
Because of the abstract nature of the model, we used a high level specification
modelling the global view of the adversary. This means that we have no need
to specify explicit communicating processes; instead we use a state based spec-
ification modelling operations as the possible adversary actions in the Bellare–
Rogaway model. Our choice of formal language for the specifications was Z [2].
Some of the reasons for the choice of Z are the following.
– There are widely used and understood conventions for modelling state based
systems in Z; this is the obvious way to structure a highly abstract protocol
specfication. It is appropriate to specify the Bellare–Rogaway model as a
state based specification since the adversary has a global view of the protocol
which is updated following each action of the adversary.
– The notation and semantics of Z are based on set theory and first order
predicate logic. This means that Z specifications are easily accessible for
most computer scientists and mathematically trained users.
– Z is widely used in the research community and by practitioners, and is also
approaching international standardisation. There are a number of friendly
tools available to support development of Z specifications and animation
which are freely available, at least for academic research purposes.
Animation is an established technique in software engineering to allow clients
to verify that a formal specification corresponds to the real world expectations
of the system. This informal process is part of the user acceptance process and
allows the system functionality to be examined before implementation takes
place. Many of these features make animation a valuable addition to the process
of formal modelling of security protocols.
We used the software tool Possum. Possum was developed at the Software
Verification Research Centre at the University of Queensland [13]. It provides
animation of specifications written in Sum, which is essentially a markup of Z.
Possum supports Z conventions for modelling state based systems and allows for
manual as well as script based animations. It also supports a graphical front end
to enable visual animation of specifications if required.
2 Specifying the Bellare–Rogaway Model
In this section we give an informal definition of the Bellare–Rogaway model
and outline how the model was specified in Sum. We first consider the model
of communication which governs what the adversary is allowed to do. We then
explore the definition of security.
2.1 Model of communication
The model of communication used is independent of the details of the protocol
and is the same for all protocols with the same set of principals and the same
protocol goals. The adversary controls all the communications that take place
and does this by interacting with a set of oracles, each of which represents an
instance of a principal in a specific protocol run. The principals are defined by an
identifier U from a finite set and an oracle ΠsU represents the actions of principal
U in the protocol run indexed by integer s. Interactions with the adversary are
called oracle queries and the list of allowed queries is summarised in Table 1. This
list applies to the model appropriate for server based key transport protocols,
as described in Bellare and Rogaway’s 1995 paper [3]; additional queries are
appropriate for other protocol types. We now describe each one informally.
Send(U, s,M) Send message M to oracle ΠsU
Reveal(U, s) Reveal session key (if any) accepted by ΠsU
Corrupt(U,K) Reveal state of U and set long-term key of U to K
Test(U, s) Attempt to distinguish session key accepted by oracle ΠsU
Table 1. Queries available to the adversary in Bellare-Rogaway model
Send(U, s,M) - This query allows the adversary to make the principals run the
protocol normally. The oracle ΠsU will return to the adversary the next mes-
sage that an honest principal U would do if sent messageM according to the
conversation so far. (This includes the possibilty that M is just a random
string in which case ΠsU may simply halt.) If Π
s
U accepts the session key or
halts this is included in the response. The adversary can also use this query
to start a new protocol instance by sending an empty message M in which
case U will start a protocol run with a new index s.
Reveal(U, s) This query models the adversary’s ability to find old session keys.
If a session key Ks has previously been accepted by ΠsU then it is returned
to the adversary. An oracle can only accept a key once (of course a principal
can accept many keys modelled in different oracles).
Corrupt(U,K) This query models insider attacks by the adversary. The query
returns the oracle’s internal state and sets the long-term key of U to be
the value K chosen by the adversary. The adversary can then control the
behaviour of U with Send queries.
Test(U, s) Once the oracle ΠsU has accepted a session key Ks the adversary
can attempt to distinguish it from a random key as the basis of determining
security of the protocol. A random bit b is chosen; if b = 0 the Ks is returned
while if b = 1 a random string is returned from the same distribution as
session keys.
The Send(U, s,M) query implicitly assumes a specification of the protocol
which is being analysed. This is provided in a rather informal manner in typical
use of the Bellare–Rogaway model, by simply stating what each principal should
do on receipt of each protocol message. In our formal specification we give ab-
stract operations corresponding to each possible message that can be invoked by
the adversary. We explicitly define instances of each principal.
The Reveal(U, s) query corresponds to an explicit operation in the specifica-
tion. Figure 1 shows the schema. The principal and instance are chosen as inputs
and if the instance has accepted then its name is added to the set of revealed
instances and the key it accepted is added to the set of exposed keys.
op schema Reveal is
dec
p? : Players;
i? : Instances
pred
(p?,i?) in accepted;
revealed’ = revealed union {(p?,i?)};
exposedKeys’ = exposedKeys union {entityKeys(p?,i?)};
changes_only{revealed,exposedKeys}
end Reveal;
Fig. 1. Sum schema specifying Reveal(U, s) query
We did not explicitly model the Corrupt(U,K) query in our specification since
it was not needed to demonstrate the attack. This can easily be added, however,
by allowing the long-term key of principal U to be added to the set of keys
known to the adversary.
Since the Test(U, s) query models the probabilistic advantage of the adversary
(discussed further below) we deliberately avoid modelling this query explicitly.
Instead we look only for ‘trivial’ losses of session keys by recording which keys
are known to the adversary. This allows us to keep the specification simple, while
at the same time seems sufficient to capture mechanistic attacks which can be
missed when concentrating on a complexity theoretic analysis.
2.2 Defining Security
Success of the adversary is measured in terms of its advantage in distinguishing
the session key from a random key after running the Test query. If we define
Good-Guess to be the event that the adversary guesses correctly whether b = 0
or b = 1 then
Advantage = 2 · Pr[Good-Guess]− 1.
A critical element in the definition of security is the notion of the partner of
an oracle, which captures the idea of the principal with which any oracle ‘thinks’
it is communicating. The way of defining partner oracles has varied in different
papers using the Bellare–Rogaway model. In the more recent research partners
have been defined by having the same session identifier (SID) which consists of a
concatenation of the messages exchanged between the two. Partners must both
have accepted the same session key and recognise each other as partners.
The Test query may only be used for an oracle which has not been corrupted
and which has accepted a session key that has not been revealed in a Reveal
query. In addition partner of the oracle to be tested must not have had a Reveal
query.
Bellare and Rogaway define a protocol in this model to be secure if:
1. when the protocol is run without any intervention from the adversary then
both principals will accept the same session key.
2. Advantage is a computationally negligible function (it decreases faster than
any polynomial function in terms of the length of the cryptographic keys).
The first condition is a completeness criterion that guarantees that the protocol
will run as expected in normal circumstances. The second condition says that the
adversary is unable to find anything useful about the session key after interacting
in the specified way. One may ask how this condition relates to more conventional
protocol goals. For example, key establishment protocols are typically required
to provide key authentication which means that a principals should know which
other principals have. or may have, the new session key. Although the above
definition appears to be concerned only with key confidentiality it does imply
key authentication. For suppose that the session key is known to an oracle ΠsU
different from that recorded in an oracle ΠtU ′ to be tested. Then Π
s
U is not the
partner of ΠtU ′ and so it can be opened by the adversary and so the protocol
cannot be secure.
A key is defined as fresh in the Bellare-Rogaway model if it has been accepted
by an oracle which has not been opened, its partner (if any) has not been opened,
and the user it represents has not been corrupted. Since the Test query can only
be performed on oracles with fresh keys all keys accepted in a secure protocol
must be fresh.
In the formal specification every schema operation may potentially change
the state of the protocol. Rather than define security directly we found it more
natural to test the insecurity of the state of the protocol in the schema operation
Insecure shown in Figure 2. The set exposedKeys is specified to denote the set of
exposed keys. The only mechanism that can update exposedKeys is the operation
Reveal . The Insecure operation verifies that for every key in the set of exposed
keys there exists an instance of a player (an oracle) such that the following
conditions hold:
1. the oracle has accepted the exposed key;
2. the oracle has not been revealed (and has accepted the exposed key); and,
3. the partner of the oracle has not been revealed and has accepted the exposed
key.
This means that a Reveal query can be used to obtain a key that should not be
know by the adversary. The Insecure operation may be invoked at any time to
test whether an insecure state has been reached.
op schema Insecure is
pred
exists k: Keys @ (k in exposedKeys) and
(exists p:Players; i:Instances @
((p,i) in accepted diff revealed) and (entityKeys(p,i) = k) and
(partnerOf(p,i) in accepted diff revealed));
changes_only{}
end Insecure
Fig. 2. Sum schema specifying an insecure state
3 Specification and Analysis
Jakobsson and Pointcheval’s protocol [14] was designed specifically for use be-
tween a low-power computational device and a powerful server. It is a combina-
tion of a Diffie-Hellman exchange and a Schnorr signature. Computation takes
place in a subgroup of Z∗p where p is a suitable large prime. The element g gen-
erates the subgroup which has prime order q with q|(p− 1). In Figure 3 the low
power entity A is able to complete all the computations required to send the
first message off-line as long as the public key of the server, B, is previously
available. This means that only simple calculations need to be performed by A
during the protocol run itself. A by-product of the improved efficiency is that
forward secrecy is not provided, since once xB is compromised any previously
agreed session keys become available.
Shared Information: Three hash functions h1, h2, h3 with outputs of lengths l1, l2, l3
respectively. Security parameter k (suggested value k = 64).
A B
rA, r
′
A ∈R Zq
K = yrAB
r = h2(g
r′A)
tA = g
rA B, tA, r−−−−−−−→ K = txBA
X = h3(yB , tA,K)
X, e←−−−−−−− e ∈R {0, 1}k
X
?
= h3(yB , tA,K)
d = r′A − exB mod q A, d−−−−−−−→ r ?= h2(gdyeB , yB , tA,K)
KAB = h1(yA, tA,K)
Fig. 3. Jakobsson-Pointcheval protocol
Figure 3 shows a traditional informal description of the protocol. This is
the original version. In the revised version the message field r was defined by
r = h2(gr
′
A , yB , tA,K); this change connects the signature (d, r) to the session
key to prevent an impersonation attack discovered by Wong and Chan [18]. The
protocol, in both its original and revised versions, carried a proof of security in
the Bellare–Rogaway model.
We specified the Jakobsson–Pointcheval protocol in Sum in a very abstract
manner. We used the Possum animator to explore the specification and demon-
strate the attack. The full specification is present in Appendix A.
3.1 Data types and protocol state
The data types that are central to the specification can be broadly classified into
the following categories:
1. Names for every instance of every player. Every oracle, which is an
instance of a protocol principal, is specified by an ordered pair of the form
(playerNumber , instanceNumber). When any two instances have the same
playerNumber , it is assumed that both the instances contain the same long-
term secret values that the player is specified to possess. The data type for
these 2-tuples is named Entities == Players × Instances.
2. Names for every type of message that could be exchanged in the
protocol. Every message, which the original protocol design specifies for
communication, is specified as a type. Therefore, the specification contains
as many message types as the number of messages communicated during a
single protocol run without any intervention from the adversary. Every com-
munication of the protocol can then be specified as a collection of message
types sent by an oracle to another oracle.
The state of the protocol is specified to hold a set of datasets which provides a
global view of the protocol that an adversary could possess. The person animat-
ing the specification would then have the view of an adversary who has access
to every communicated message by every entity and who has the capability
to induce any entity to change state by providing the appropriate inputs. The
adversary can obtains such inputs either by choosing random elements belong-
ing to a particular message type or by using oracle queries to various entities,
which are represented as schema operations. The schema operations are the only
mechanisms that can be used to change the state of the protocol.
3.2 Specification of secret values
The cryptographic operations using secret keys that various entities possess are
not explicitly modelled. Rather, they are modelled as operations that a valid
entity, which possesses a set of valid secret keys, can perform. For example, the
oracles that are modelled by schema operation SendMessage1 are assumed to
possess the long-term private key of the server. Therefore, this schema speci-
fies the capability to compute shared Diffie-Hellman keys, which specified using
the function dhKeys(.). Thus, this schema specifies operations that any instance
of the server would perform when it receives the first communication of the
protocol run. Similarly, the entities that are modelled by the schema opera-
tion SendMessage2 are assumed to possess the long-term private key of the
corresponding client. Therefore, this schema specifies the capability to perform
Schnorr signature operations by the following operations:
.......
d’ = d + 1;
dSeenBy’ = dSeenBy func_override {(p?, j?) |--> d};
.......
That is the ability to update the signature counter, specified by d, and the
“seen by” function specified by dSeenBy , which is specified to contain either the
set of valid signatures that valid entities generated during some past operation
or the set of claimed signatures that a particular entity received. The claimed
signatures will be valid if the signature is claimed to be from an entity that
indeed generated the signature, or invalid if the signature is claimed to be from an
entity that did not generate the signature. The schema operation SendMessage3
specifies a signature verification operation using the dSeenBy function along
with some other functions. That is, valid signature generators, who possess the
corresponding long-term private key, can write to the dSeenBy dataset and any
verifier can read the dSeenBy dataset.
3.3 The initialisation operation
The protocol state is initialised using the schema named init . The initialisation
function deletes the memory of every oracle, initialises the counters for the re-
spective message types, initialises the lists of accepted and revealed oracles, and
updates the partnerOf function.
Immediately after initialisation, every oracle is a partner of itself. The reason
for this initialisation is to allow a consistent definition of the security of the
protocol state as discussed in Section 2.2. This is because security depends on
both the oracle and its partner (which may or may not exist) not having been
asked a Reveal query. The schema operation MatchPartner , shown in Figure 4
is the only mechanism to alter the behaviour of the partnerOf function. The
MatchPartner schema operation will update the partnerOf function only when
certain preconditions are satisfied, which ensure that both parties possess the
same session identifier.
3.4 Analysis of the specification
When the command can be executed, or when the preconditions are met, the
animator provides an output (or a solution). The solution is the state information
before and after the operation. Figure 5 shows a series of animation commands
that were executed. Each numbered command is a user input, and the number
is incremented if the command is successful. The outputs are not provided here
op schema MatchPartner is
dec
i?: Instances;
client?: Players
pred
exists c: Instances |
(bSeenBy(0,i?) = bSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(aSeenBy(0,i?) = aSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(rSeenBy(0,i?) = rSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(dSeenBy(0,i?) = dSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(eSeenBy(0,i?) = eSeenBy(client?,c)) @
(partnerOf’ = partnerOf func_override {(0,i?) |--> (client?,c),
(client?,c) |--> (0,i?)});
// this server instance thinks that client? is its partner
changes_only{partnerOf}
end MatchPartner;
Fig. 4. Sum specification of partner function
to save space; instead the string “solution” is inserted to represent the state
information. When there is no solution the animator outputs the string “no
solution.” Finally an insecure state is reached revealing a successful attack. (In
fact the attack shown is different from the one given by Wong and Chan [18]
although it exploits the same weakness.)
Note that during the initialisation phase, every oracle was specified to be
a partner of itself. Therefore, if an oracle has accepted a session key and it
is its own partner (that is the schema operation named MatchPartner fails to
match a partner for this oracle), then the protocol state can become insecure
when an appropriate Reveal operation is performed. Therefore, to provide secu-
rity, it is important that the schema operation SendMessage3 has a solution,
if the corresponding MatchPartner schema operation has a solution. The cor-
respondence between these schema operations is specified by the input variable
denoting the instance of a server oracle (i?) and the input variable denoting the
client (client?). The proposed “fix” to the protocol by Jakobsson and Pointcheval
adopts such a mechanism by specifying a similar sequence of operations for the
SendMessage3 and MatchPartner schema operations.
4 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that the Bellare–Rogaway model can be specified for-
mally in a state-based specification with a simplified security definition. Using
an example we have shown that this model could have found attacks that were
missed even when protocols have been proven secure in the model. We believe
that such an approach complements the human derived proofs. Furthermore the
specification can help to clarify the meaning of these proofs, and animation of
the specification allows the model to be more accessible to practitioners.
4 MutualAuth: StartClient{1/p?,0/j?}
solution
5 MutualAuth: StartClient{2/p?,0/j?}
solution
6 MutualAuth: SendMessage1{0/i?,10/b?,31/r?}
solution
7 MutualAuth: SendMessage1{1/i?,11/b?,30/r?}
solution
8 MutualAuth: SendMessage2{1/p?,0/j?,20/a?,41/e?}
solution
9 MutualAuth: SendMessage2{2/p?,0/j?,21/a?,40/e?}
solution
10 MutualAuth: SendMessage3{0/i?,2/client?,51/d?}
solution
11 MutualAuth: SendMessage3{1/i?,1/client?,50/d?}
solution
12 MutualAuth: MatchPartner{0/i?,1/client?}
no solution
12 MutualAuth: MatchPartner{1/i?,1/client?}
no solution
12 MutualAuth: MatchPartner{1/i?,2/client?}
no solution
12 MutualAuth: MatchPartner{0/i?,2/client?}
no solution
12 MutualAuth: Insecure
no solution
12 MutualAuth: Reveal{2/p?,0/i?}
solution
13 MutualAuth: Insecure
solution
Fig. 5. Animated attack on the Sum specification
We regard the work in this paper as a first step, demonstrating the potential
of unifying cryptographic proofs and formal specifications. There are a number
of ways that we are planning to extend this work.
– We intend to conduct a similar analysis of other protocols to gain a better
understanding of how best to use the model.
– We plan to explore protocols which use different cryptographic properties.
These will be modelled using different oracles available to the adversary,
particularly encryption and decryption oracles.
– We would like to experiment with use of purpose-built model checkers to
automate searching of the specification.
– We would like to use a theorem prover to provide machine checkable proofs
at a high level to complement the human derived proofs.
– We intend to specify other models which provide cryptographic reduction
proofs, particularly Canetti-Krawczyk’s modular method [11].
The ultimate goal of this work would be a fully formalised proof of security
for cryptographic protocols which is able to capture the probabilistic reduction
to a known cryptographic primitive or computational problem. At present such
a goal appears out of reach.
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A Sum specification of Jakobsson-Pointcheval protocol
module MutualAuth is
// The following types are used to name the players in the protocol.
Players == 0 .. 4; // Player 0 is the server
// and the remaining players are the clients.
// So, this spec considers a server and four clients.
Instances == 0 .. 4;
Entities == Players cross Instances;
// The following types of messages are communicated in the protocol.
MessageB == 10 .. 19;
MessageA == 20 .. 29;
MessageR == 30 .. 39;
MessageE == 40 .. 49;
MessageD == 50 .. 59;
// The following type represents the "index" of the cryptographic keys.
Keys == 60 .. 69;
// The following schema represents the state of the protocol
// at any point of execution. The state is basically a collection
// of messages that have been communicated and the status of every
// instance of every player.
schema state is
dec
b: MessageB;
a: MessageA;
r: MessageR;
e: MessageE;
d: MessageD;
k: Keys;
dhKeys: MessageB -|-> Keys;
bSeenBy: Entities -|-> MessageB;
aSeenBy: Entities -|-> MessageA;
rSeenBy: Entities -|-> MessageR;
eSeenBy: Entities -|-> MessageE;
dSeenBy: Entities -|-> MessageD;
entityKeys: Entities -|-> Keys;
partnerOf: Entities -|-> Entities;
accepted: power Entities;
revealed: power Entities;
exposedKeys: power Keys
end state;
// The following schema initialises the state.
// 1) All message counters are reset to their initial values.
// 2) The sent message memory is erased.
// 3) The partnerOf function is initialised so that every entity
// is a parter of itself.
schema init is
pred
b’ = 10;
a’ = 20;
r’ = 30;
e’ = 40;
d’ = 50;
k’ = 60;
dom bSeenBy’ = {};
dom aSeenBy’ = {};
dom rSeenBy’ = {};
dom eSeenBy’ = {};
dom dSeenBy’ = {};
dom dhKeys’ = {};
dom entityKeys’ = {};
// Initially the dummy player is the partner for all instances.
partnerOf’ = {
((0,0),(0,0)),((0,1),(0,1)),((0,2),(0,2)),((0,3),(0,3)),((0,4),(0,4)),
((1,0),(1,0)),((1,1),(1,1)),((1,2),(1,2)),((1,3),(1,3)),((1,4),(1,4)),
((2,0),(2,0)),((2,1),(2,1)),((2,2),(2,2)),((2,3),(2,3)),((2,4),(2,4)),
((3,0),(3,0)),((3,1),(3,1)),((3,2),(3,2)),((3,3),(3,3)),((3,4),(3,4)),
((4,0),(4,0)),((4,1),(4,1)),((4,2),(4,2)),((4,3),(4,3)),((4,4),(4,4))
};
exposedKeys’ = {};
accepted’ = {};
revealed’ = {}
end init;
// $Send({\cal B},j,‘‘start’’)$
op schema StartClient is
dec
p? : Players;
j? : Instances
pred
p? > 0 ;
changes_only{bSeenBy,rSeenBy,dhKeys,entityKeys,k,b,r};
bSeenBy’ = bSeenBy func_override {(p?,j?) |--> b};
rSeenBy’ = rSeenBy func_override {(p?,j?) |--> r};
dhKeys’ = dhKeys func_override {b |--> k};
entityKeys’ = entityKeys func_override {(p?,j?) |--> k};
k’ = k + 1;
b’ = b + 1;
r’ = r + 1
end StartClient;
// $Send({\cal A},i,({\cal A},B,r))$
op schema SendMessage1 is
dec
i?: Instances;
b?: MessageB;
r?: MessageR
pred
//br’ = br func_override {i? |--> (b,r)};
entityKeys’ = entityKeys func_override {(0,i?) |--> dhKeys(b?)};
a’ = a + 1;
e’ = e + 1;
aSeenBy’ = aSeenBy func_override {(0,i?) |--> a};
eSeenBy’ = eSeenBy func_override {(0,i?) |--> e};
bSeenBy’ = bSeenBy func_override {(0,i?) |--> b?};
rSeenBy’ = rSeenBy func_override {(0,i?) |--> r?};
changes_only{entityKeys,a,e,aSeenBy,eSeenBy,bSeenBy,rSeenBy}
end SendMessage1;
// $Send({\cal B}, j, (A, e))$
op schema SendMessage2 is
dec
p?: Players;
j?: Instances;
a?: MessageA;
e?: MessageE
pred
p? > 0; //this message is not sent to the server
d’ = d + 1;
dSeenBy’ = dSeenBy func_override {(p?,j?) |--> d};
aSeenBy’ = aSeenBy func_override {(p?,j?) |--> a?};
eSeenBy’ = eSeenBy func_override {(p?,j?) |--> e?};
// The check is $A = H_2 (y_A, B, K)$ is performed by server by
// checking if the corresponding values exist in memory of some
// server instance. $y_A$ is not specified here as it is assumed to be
// redundant.
exists s:Instances @ (entityKeys(p?,j?) = entityKeys(0,s)) and
(aSeenBy(0,s) = a?);
accepted’ = accepted union {(p?,j?)};
changes_only{d,dSeenBy,aSeenBy,eSeenBy,accepted}
end SendMessage2;
// $Send({\cal A}, i, ({\cal B}, d))$
op schema SendMessage3 is
dec
i?: Instances;
client?: Players;
d?: MessageD
pred
client? > 0 ;
exists c: Instances @ (rSeenBy(0,i?) = rSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(eSeenBy(0,i?) = eSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(dSeenBy(client?,c) = d?);
dSeenBy’ = dSeenBy func_override {(0,i?) |--> d?};
accepted’ = accepted union {(0,i?)};
changes_only{dSeenBy,accepted}
end SendMessage3;
// The following schema is used to match the partners of various
// instances. This schema suitable adjusts the partnerOf function.
op schema MatchPartner is
dec
i?: Instances;
client?: Players
pred
exists c: Instances |
(bSeenBy(0,i?) = bSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(aSeenBy(0,i?) = aSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(rSeenBy(0,i?) = rSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(dSeenBy(0,i?) = dSeenBy(client?,c)) and
(eSeenBy(0,i?) = eSeenBy(client?,c)) @
(partnerOf’ = partnerOf func_override {(0,i?) |--> (client?,c),
(client?,c) |--> (0,i?)});
// this server instance thinks that client? is its partner
changes_only{partnerOf}
end MatchPartner;
// $Reveal($\cal U$, i)$
op schema Reveal is
dec
p? : Players;
i? : Instances
pred
(p?,i?) in accepted;
revealed’ = revealed union {(p?,i?)};
exposedKeys’ = exposedKeys union {entityKeys(p?,i?)};
changes_only{revealed,exposedKeys}
end Reveal;
// The following schema is not a part of the Bellare-Rogaway model.
// It is used to test if the protocol state is insecure. The protocol
// is insecure if there exists an exposed key such that there exists
// an instance of a player such that: 1) that player has accepted the
// exposed key and did not reveal the exposed key; and,
// 3) the partner of that player has accepted the "some" key and
// did not reveal the exposed key.
op schema InSecure is
pred
exists k: Keys @ (k in exposedKeys) and
(exists p:Players; i:Instances @
((p,i) in accepted diff revealed) and (entityKeys(p,i) = k) and
(partnerOf(p,i) in accepted diff revealed));
changes_only{}
end InSecure
end MutualAuth
